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The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)  combines countries with
deep economic  differences  in  a  process  of trade  liberalization,  and  this experience
was unknown  worldwide.  The  contrasts  between  Mexico  and  its  other  two North
American  partners  are  striking  in terms of  their agricultural  structures  and  this is
particularly so between the Mexican and the U.S. corn subsectors. This difference has
lead some  analysts  and politicians  to predict that with NAFTA,  corn production  in
Mexico  will  tend  to  disappear  and  hundreds  of  thousands  of  Mexicans  will  be
displaced from the rural sector.
Mexico's rural economy  is  itself heterogeneous.  This, in addition  to  the  con-
trasts between the agricultural sectors of the North American countries, raises doubts
about the possibility of attaining economic  harmonization of the grain and livestock
subsector of the three countries.
The  main purposes  in this paper are to  analyze  quantitatively  the impacts of
policy reforms  on small-scale  corn and livestock  farmers in Mexico,  and to discuss
some of the results in the  context of the issues of concern in this Workshop  i.e.,  com-
petition of the North American corn and livestock subsectors and their economic har-
monization in the three countries.
The paper begins  with an overview of the adjustment processes  that Mexico's
agricultural  sector  has  experienced  since  the  beginning  of  the  nineties;  and  dis-
cussion  of  the  expectations  about  the  impacts  on  Mexican  agriculture  that  this
process of reforms  may bring about,  and discussion of characteristics of the Mexican
corn and livestock subsectors. With this background,  our analytical model-a village-
wide general equilibrium model of rural households-is used to quantify the impactsGrain-Livestock  Harmonization
of policy changes on small-scale corn and livestock producers.  The application of this
model  is to a typical  village in Central Mexico.  The paper ends with a discussion of
our findings in relation to the NAFTA and agricultural policies.
THE ADJUSTMENT  PROCESS
A decade  before the  beginning  of NAFTA's  negotiations,  the governments  of
Mexico began  a radical change  in development  strategy.  It has  consisted in moving
public policy from import substitution to outward orientation, which has meant con-
siderable reduction  of government intervention  in the economy.
Among  other measures,  the  liberalization  process  in agriculture  consisted  of
abolition  of import controls  of "basic staples",  elimination  of producers'  price  sup-
ports,  reduction  or  elimination  of  State  owned  enterprises'  activities  in  buying,
importing, storing, processing and selling staples such as corn, beans, rice, wheat, oil-
seeds  and  barley,  reduction  of government  subsidies  in rural  credit and  insurance,
privatization of agricultural parastatals  and the  irrigation  system,  and liberalization
of property  rights  in  land  (the  latter  known  as  the  Ejidal  Reform.  See  details  in
Yunez-Naude,  A.).
For Mexico, NAFTA cannot be taken exclusively as an accord to liberalize agri-
cultural trade among the three North American countries.  Until the eighties, the agri-
cultural  sector  of  Mexico  was  heavily  influenced  by  governmental  policies  and
interventions.  The domestic  agricultural reforms that the Salinas Administration  ini-
tiated  before  and  during  the  beginning  of  the  negotiations  were  a  signal  to  the
United States  that the  Mexican  purposes  of liberalizing  the sector were  serious and
lasting. Those reforms are still in place and in  line with the  commitments  of the last
two Mexican  governments under NAFTA and the Uruguay Round.
The liberalization process included the Ejidal Reform and a major reduction of
the  activities  of CONASUPO  (The National  Company  of Popular Subsistence),  the
major  governmental  agricultural  agency  regulating  prices,  and  involved  in  trade,
storage,  processing and distribution of staples.  These  reforms  meant the abolition of
prohibitions  of leasing and selling Ejidal lands (those distributed to peasants after the
Revolution of  1910), and the  elimination of the support prices CONASUPO  granted
to  12 crops and to milk, but not to corn and beans.
Under  NAFTA,  Mexico  implements  tariff  rate  quotas  (TRQs)  to agricultural
commodities  that the Salinas'  Administration  considered sensitive  for  Mexican  pro-
ducers.  They  include  corn,  dry  beans  and  some  animal  products  (dried  milk)
(Shagam,  S.D.  and  D.  Plunkett).  The  Mexican  government  plans  to  eliminate  the
TRQs  for  corn  and  milk  by  the  year  2003.  Up  to  the  beginning  of  the  nineties,
CONASUPO controlled  the trade of corn, imported the grain to cover the differences
between  domestic  supply  and  demand  and  settled  a  producers'  support price  (or
guaranteed  price)  higher than the international  price. CONASUPO  still intervenes in
the corn and powdered milk markets by importing them and, together with SECOFI
(the Ministry of Commerce),  by allocating their quotas.  CONASUPO  is still the sole
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importer of milk powder to implement its program of milk distribution for the young
poor; it then auctions the balance of its purchases to the private sector.  In the case  of
corn,  it still subsidizes  millers for the production of "tortillas"  for the consumption  of
the poor.  However,  private direct  imports of corn are now allowed,  with part of the
quota assigned to the private sector's requests.
In addition, CONASUPO, together with the Ministry of Commerce, establish a
producers'  "minimum" or "intervention" price for corn. For milk (and for other crops)
the  government  negotiates  prices  with  their  producers.  Domestic  price  of corn  is
fixed taking into account  macroeconomic phenomena, the grain's international  price
and  transportation  costs.  CONASUPO  is  now  "a  last  instance  buyer"  of  corn  if
farmers cannot get a higher  price in the market. However,  government interventions
in the  corn market have  meant that the domestic  price of corn  is still considerably
higher  than  its  international  price. 1 Consequently,  reduced  intervention  is  still  a
policy option to fully liberalize corn market as reform programs continue.  This is the
case of corn and powdered milk under NAFTA.  For these commodities, the tariff rate
quotas  established by Mexico  in NAFTA  will be eliminated  between  the years 2003
and 2008.
EXPECTATIONS  AND  FACTS
The last two Administrations and the current one expect that, with economic
liberalization,  macroeconomic  stability  is  going  to  be  achieved.  In  addition,  they
expect  that  reform,  together  with  NAFTA,  will  promote  savings  and  foreign
investment,  and  a  new  vigorous  stage  of sustained  economic  development.  With
respect  to  the  agricultural  sector,  the  reduction  of state intervention  is  expected  to
lead  to efficient use  of the  resources of rural  Mexico.  Market  forces  will reallocate
scarce  rural  resources  to  activities  such  as  horticultural  and  livestock  production,
where  the  country  has  comparative  advantage.  Governments  have  not  been  too
worried about the consequences  of this change on food self-sufficiency  and on rural
emigration.
In contrast, the critics of the liberalization  processes and  NAFTA are worried
about  food  self-sufficiency  and  pessimistic  about  the  absorption  by  industry  and
services  of workers displaced  from  the rural  economy. Based on the  argument  that
Mexican  staple and livestock producers are not competitive  and on the fact that a big
proportion  of the  labor  force  is engaged  in  these  activities,  they foresee  that,  with
trade liberalization, the domestic supply of food will be sharply reduced and millions
of people will be displaced from the rural sector (Calva,  1995).
Mexico's  agricultural  sector has grown at  rates below  its population  growth
since the seventies  (that is before and after the reforms).  However,  domestic agricul-
tural supply did not sink from  1991  to  1996. Corn production increased  during  1992
1According  to  official  data,  the difference  between  the  corn support  price  and  the average import  price of corn
(volume of corn imports divided  by its value)  is around 40 percent.  A similar difference  is present in the relation
between the average domestic price of corn and its average  import price (Source: Mexican Ministry of Agriculture).
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and  1993 and remained at this level during 1994-96  (SAGAR,  1994). In part, this latter
phenomenon  is explained by the fact that government still supports corn production,
which  has  meant  a higher  relative  price  of corn  with respect  to  other  competitive
crops.  It  may also  be related  to  the  fact  that a  portion  of small-scale  farmers  pro-
ducing  corn  is  isolated  from  the  agricultural  products'  markets  and/or  to  policy
changes.  (Notwithstanding, their production  is considered in government statistics).
STRUCTURAL  ADJUSTMENT  AND  SMALL-SCALE FARMERS
Most of the studies,  discussions and official  expectations  on the  effects  of the
reforms  and  NAFTA  on  the  agricultural  sector  are  too  aggregated  and  do  not
emphasize  the  enormous  heterogeneity  prevailing  in  Mexico's  countryside.  This  is
the case of the production of corn and livestock and its products, where large,  entre-
preneurial,  modern and capitalized  farms coexist with small-scale and poor farmers. 2
It is also frequent in traditional economic analyses to ignore the fact that, historically,
most  of  the  corn  production-the  basic  foods  in  Mexicans'  diet-is  done  not  by
modern agriculture,  but by family units of small-scale  production and consumption,
using rainfed  land, and whose  members are also engaged in activities  other than the
production  of corn.  These additional sources  of small-farmers'  income  include  live-
stock,  an activity that ranges from cattle  raising to the production of eggs. A typical
family  agricultural  unit  in  Mexico  has  therefore  diversified  sources  of  income,
coming  from  the  involvement  of  their  members  in  crop  production,  livestock,
articrafts,  commerce and in regional, domestic and the U.S. labor markets (Taylor, J.E.
and A. Yunez-Naude,  Ch. 4:  forthcoming).
The significance  of small-scale farmers in the  production of corn is illustrated
by the  fact that this grain is by far the most important  crop in  Mexico  with around
70 percent  of it is obtained  in rainfed farms whose owners have around two hectares
of land (Zedillo, E. and Taylor and Yunez-Naude,  op.cit.).3
Another feature of Mexico's agricultural sector is that an important portion of
staple  and  livestock  production  comes  from  small-scale  farmers  which  is  not
marketed-it  goes  to  the  family's  own  consumption-using  family  (non-waged)
labor.4 This means that a segment of small-scale  farmers face incomplete  agricultural
product and labor markets, making the notion  of competition  an inappropriate  ana-
lytical tool.
2For example, during 1991  farmers with more  than 8 hectares  (ha.) of irrigated  land cropped with corn obtained
more than  5.5 tons per ha. of the grain, whereas  units with 2.3  ha. of rainfed land  got less than  1.4 tons per ha of
cropped  corn  (Yunez-Naude,  A.  et  al.:  76).  Similar  contrasts  exist  in  Mexico's  livestock  sector.  For example,
67 percent of the bovine herd producing milk  is also used by small farmers to produce meat. This subsector only
contributes  to 30 percent of the domestic  supply of milk, whereas  the specialized farmers  produce 54 percent  of
the total supply with just 8 percent of the bovine milk-producing herd (Davalos Flores, J.L.)
3During the first half of the nineties,  the contribution of corn to agricultural  GDP was  15  percent, its production
employed  14.2 percent of workers  engaged in agriculture  and its cultivation  occupied  more  than 35  percent  of
total cropped land. In contrast, the combined  contribution to agricultural GDP, employment  and used land of the
three  crops  that follow  corn  (sugar, sorghum  and  beans)  is  less than  that  of corn  (Salinas  de  Gortari, C.  and
J.L. Calva).
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Rural  Mexico  is  hence  characterized  by  a  patchwork  of  staple  surplus-
producing regions and local economies  producing little or no surplus for regional or
national  markets.  In the  latter  economies,  the price of staples  is  likely to be  endo-
genous and so, their producers will not be affected directly if the government decides
to eliminate their price supports.  Notwithstanding the isolation of a portion of small-
scale farmers in staple and livestock markets, they are linked to regional and national
inputs and manufacturing  markets, as well as to the national and international  labor
markets.  A typical  Mexican  rural household requires  manufactured goods produced
elsewhere  in Mexico, and members  of the  unit work for a wage in the region,  in the
rest of Mexico or in the United States. Part of the  income earned by family members
in these labor markets is sent  as remittances  to the family unit, which  are frequently
an important component of the unit's budget.
Explicit  consideration  of these  phenomena  is fundamental  to  economic  har-
monization of North American  agricultures and for doing rigorous impact analyses
of  NAFTA,  policy  reforms  and  alternative  agricultural  development  strategies.
Unfortunately,  nationwide  data on factor use,  production,  consumption and  market
linkages at the rural household level are not available.  Therefore,  empirical studies of
these characteristics have to rely on surveys designed for these purposes.
Professor J.E.  Taylor University of California  (Davis), and I have been coordi-
nating such efforts during the last years by doing surveys to rural households, repre-
sentative  of small-scale  farming  in  Mexico.  Among other  information,  the surveys
capture  data  of  representative  households'  production  of  agricultural  and  non-
agricultural commodities;  on their consumption  of goods and services;  on the use  of
family  labor  inside  and  outside  the  unit;  and  on  the  households'  relations  with
village,  regional,  national  and foreign  (US) input,  product and  labor markets.  With
this data base, we have built village-wide  general equilibrium  models to estimate the
impacts  of  policy  reforms  on  small-scale  staple  and  livestock  producers  of  rural
Mexico.
VILLAGE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM  MODELING
The village-wide  model we propose to  use  to estimate the impacts  of policy
reforms  on small-scale  corn  and livestock-producing  farms has  a social  accounting
matrix (SAM) as its  data base.5 The village  SAM is built from information obtained
for this  purpose in  surveys  applied to a  sample  of representative  households.  The
village  general  equilibrium  model  (VGEM)  integrates  micro-economic,  household-
farm modeling  into  a village  general-equilibrium  framework,  making it possible  to
capture  both direct  and indirect  impacts  of policy and  other exogenous  changes  on
rural  economies.  This modeling  approach  captures  the  diversified  nature  of rural
4An  official national survey on corn  production during  1991-92  shows that more than  30 percent of it is used  for
the  production  units' own  consumption  (human,  animal or  as seeds  for  future cultivation),  and  that  around
20 percent of the total labor costs come from use of family labor.  See Yunez-Naude,  A.et al.,: 81-2).
5The model was built  in a joint research  effort with Prof. J.E.  Taylor,  financed by the William  and Flora Hewlett
Foundation and the Pacific  Rim Research Program (University of California).
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households'  activities  and  second  round  effects  of  policy  changes,  through  their
impacts  on  expenditures  and  production  in household-farm  economies.  Economic
linkages  among household-farms  transmit direct impacts of policy changes  to other
households  inside and outside the rural sector. These linkages may either dampen or
magnify the effects of policy reforms, and they may alter or even reverse  the impacts
of policies on production,  incomes and migration.
This  technique can  be used to develop  stylized  village models to  explore the
implications  of failure  in  selected  rural  markets  in shaping  agricultural  and  trade
policy impacts. This is the case  of market failures  caused by high transactions' costs
in the corn sector, which buffer the rural economy from changes in its price.
The VGEM is applied to a typical village in the central State of Michoacan:  it is
formed  by  corn and  livestock farmers,  whose  family  members  are  also engaged  in
non-agricultural  production as well as in waged labor and in migration activities. 6
The  Model
In our VGEM we consider explicitly important features of small-scale  agricul-
tural  production  in  Mexico,  such  as  the  participation  of households  in  local  and
national  inputs,  product and labor markets.  We also take into  account  migration  to
the  United  States,  that  is,  the  main  and  usually  only  linkage  of  Central  Mexico's
small-scale  family  farmers  with  the  "rest  of  the  world."  The  model  captures  pro-
duction and expenditure linkages within the village and between the village and the
rest  of Mexico,  including village  households'  consumption  and production  demand
for  manufactured  goods.  Mexico-to-U.S.  migration  and  internal  migration  are
modeled explicitly  as a function  of the returns to migration and the returns to family
labor in the village.
The  model  consists  of five  blocks  of  equations:  (1) a  household-farm  pro-
duction block,  (2) a household-farm  income  block, (3) an expenditure  block,  (4) a set
of general equilibrium closure equations, and (5) a price block. (The model equations
are presented in Appendix  1 of Taylor, J.E.,  A. Yunez-Naude  and S. Hampton).
The  household-farm  production  sector  includes  three  productive  sectors
(corn,  livestock  and  non-agricultural),  and  one  commercial  sector  that  serves  to
"import"  primarily  manufactured  goods  into  the  village  from  the  rest  of  Mexico.
Production in  each of the  sectors is carried  out with four factors:  family labor, hired
labor, physical capital and land. Contrasting  traditional neoclassical  household-farm
models, it is not assumed that family and hired labor are perfect substitutes.  The pro-
duction technology in each sector is specified as Cobb-Douglas. The demand for non-
factor (intermediate)  inputs, including manufactured inputs imported into the village
(for example,  fertilizer for corn production),  is determined  through the use of fixed
input-output coefficients.
6This methodology  can easily  be  extended  to other  typical  villages  and to  encompass  larger regions,  including
village-town economies.  We have some of this research underway.
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Household-farms  are  assumed  to  maximize  utility  defined  on  consumption
goods and leisure.  On the production side, this implies maximizing  net farm income
from the four production activities given market prices for output and either market
or  shadow  prices  for  factors  of production  and  intermediate  inputs.  Endogenous
shadow  prices include the family wage, which equals the  marginal utility of leisure
divided by the marginal utility of income.  Physical capital and land inputs are fixed
in the short run, but family and hired labor are variable inputs.
The household-farm sector in our model consists of three groups: small or sub-
sistence  farm households with fewer than 2 hectares of land, a middle group with 2
to 8 hectares of land, and largeholder  households with more than 8 hectares  of land.
Household-farm  income  is the  sum  of wage income;  capital,  land and  family-labor
value-added  from household-farm  production  activities;  and  migrant  remittances.
Mexico-to-U.S.  migration  and  internal  migration  are  a  function  of  the  differential
between  household  group-specific  average  migrant  remittances  and  the  shadow
price of family labor in village production activities.  The expenditure  block includes
the  consumption  demand for village  products  and  manufactured  goods produced
elsewhere  in Mexico,  leisure, savings, including  investments in physical and human
capital (schooling),  taxes, and household-to-household transfers.
The general-equilibrium  closure equations  include local market-clearing  con-
ditions  for  factors  and  goods,  a  village  savings-investment  balance,  and  a village
trade balance equation. For goods and factors for which the village is a price-taker  in
regional  markets  (that  is,  village  tradeables),  the  market-clearing  conditions
determine  net  village  marketed  surplus.  For  nontradeables,  they  determine  local
prices.  The  savings-investment  balance  constrains  village  investments  in  physical
and  human  capital to  be  self-financed,  that is,  out  of household-farm  savings.  The
trade equation  constrains the value  of village exports  of goods and  factors to equal
the  value  of village  imports.  It  represents  the  redundant  equation  in  our  village
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) system.
Prices  of  village  tradeables  are  fixed,  determined  by  markets  outside  the
village.  Prices  of village  nontradeables  are  determined  by the  interaction  of local
supply  and  demand.  Family  wages  adjust  to  ensure  that  family  time  allocated  to
village  production  activities,  to migration  and  to leisure equals  families'  total  time
endowments.  Because land is assumed fixed,  its price is also endogenous,  equal to its
marginal value product in village production activities. It is most appropriate to view
these  VGEM  as  stylized  models  of Mexican  village  economies  in different  market
settings,  estimated with household-farm survey data.
Policy Simulations and  Results
Three  sets  of  simulations  are  discussed  using  our  VGEM  to  explore  the
impacts of actual and alternative agricultural policy changes on production, incomes,
migration  and  trade.  The  first  simulation  explores  the  impact  of  a  40  percent
reduction  in government  price supports  for corn. This decrease is similar to the pre-
vailing  difference  between  the domestic  and  the international  price  of corn  and  is
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plausible  in  areas  of rural  Mexico  where  farmers  had  relatively  easy access  to the
government  guaranteed price such as villages located  near CONASUPO's  purchase
points. At the other extreme, villages that have not had access to the guaranteed price
due to  high transaction  costs of getting harvests to government  purchase points are
not likely to experience  price declines of this magnitude.
The  second  experiment  simulates  PROCAMPO,  a  government  program  in
which direct subsidy payments  compensate  farmers  for the decreased  value of their
harvests  resulting  from  lower  staple  prices.  This  set combines  a  40  percent  staple
price  decrease with a subsidy payment  equal to  40  percent  of the  base value  of the
farmers' corn harvest.
The third simulation explores  an alternative to  PROCAMPO,  the allocation of
government  savings  from  reducing  corn  price  supports  to  increase  staple produc-
tivity by  10 percent.
Two  models were  estimated  to  include  the  effects  of policy  changes  in  dif-
ferent market settings:  Model  1 assumes  perfect commodity  and hired  labor markets
(that is,  all goods and  hired labor are tradeable),  and  in Model  2 the village  is com-
pletely  cut  off  from  the  outside  market  of corn  and  labor,  and  so  their  prices  are
endogenous.
First  Experiment. A summary  of the findings  from the first simulation using Model  1
is reported in  the first column of the Table of Results. 7 The 40  percent drop  of corn-
price  reduces  corn output by 28  percent,  revealing a  high output-price  elasticity  of
corn production.  This drives down the shadow value of family labor and land, but by
a small percentage  amount compared to the magnitude  of the staple price change  (by
0.5 percent and 2.2 percent, respectively).  In response to the decreased  profitability of
producing  corn,  households  reallocate  resources  away  from  the  grain  production
toward  other  activities,  with  output  increases  of  1.8  percent  in  livestock  and
1.1 percent  in  nonagricultural  production.  As  the  shadow  value  of family  labor  in
village production decreases,  migration  increases  (by 1.3 percent),  and family leisure
demand also rises  (by 2.4 percent).
Total household-farm  income  declines, but by a small amount relative  to the
corn price  change.  Nominal  income  falls  1.6  percent.  The  high  degree  of diversifi-
cation  in the  village  means  that, ceteris paribus, a given percentage  decrease  in corn
price translates into a much smaller percentage  decrease  in total income.  The impact
of the price  change  on nominal  income  is dampened  further  by the  reallocation  of
family resources away from corn production.  In real terms, small-holder households
benefit from the  income  change;  their average  income  rises  by just under 9 percent.
These  households are  marginal producers  of corn and  therefore  lose  relatively  little
on the production side.  As heavy consumers  of corn, however, they benefit from  the
price reduction  on the consumption  side.  Subsistence  household-farms  also benefit
7The  figures in the table show percentage  changes  with respect  to the base model solution.  Model 2 of this expe-
riment is not included  in the table  since, due to its  isolation from the staple markets, the reduction  of the price of
corn has no effects on the village's economy
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from the expansion of nonfarm activities, to the extent that they supply labor to those
activities,  and  from  higher migration  income.  They lose to  the  extent  they supply
labor to corn producers.
Largeholder farms also benefit slightly in real terms (1.5 percent) from the corn
price change. As growers of corn, they lose as a result of the price decrease. However,
largeholder households are major producers of livestock, for which corn as feed is an
input. They are also engaged  in non-farm  production,  which increases  as a result of
the lower profitability of corn production. Finally, as consumers they benefit from the
lower price of corn, although to a smaller extent than subsistence households because
of their relatively low marginal propensity to consume grain.
Middle  farmers  benefit  the least  in real-income  terms  (1.0  percent).  For this
group, increased  value-added from non-corn production,  migration income and  the
benefits  of a lower  corn price  on  the  consumption  side barely compensate  for the
decline in income from  corn production.
Corn price liberalization  negatively affects trade linkages between the village
and  the  outside  world.  As  corn  production  contracts,  purchases  of intermediate
inputs by village producers  decline slightly (by 0.8 percent).  The income elasticity  of
demand  for  manufactured  goods  produced  outside  the village  is  large,  however.
Hence, villagers' demand for manufactures contracts  (by 1.6 percent)  as a result of the
income  change.  This  finding reflects the  importance  of rural-urban growth linkages
that imply negative  repercussions  of rural income declines for the urban economy.
Second Experiment. Our  second  set  of  experiments  simulates  the  effect  of  a  direct
income  subsidy designed  to compensate  staple  producers  for the  negative income
effects  of  price  liberalization.  Such  a  subsidy  is  the  centerpiece  of  Mexico's
PROCAMPO  program,  a  decoupled  support  scheme  for  staple  producers  which
began  to  be implemented  in the autumn/winter  season  of  1993-94.  As in the  first
experiment,  we  assume  a  40  percent  decrease  in the  price  of  corn.  Payments  to
farmers  are  calculated  as  a function  of the price  change times  baseline  production.
The  results  of  the  PROCAMPO  simulation  for  Models  1 and  2 are  displayed  in
columns 2 and 3 of the Table of Results.
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Table  1: Table of Results (Percentage  Change  from Base)
Experiment  1  Experiment  2  Experiment  3
eSector  Redcon  RAgricultural Sector  Reduction  PROCAMPO  Productivity
of Corn
Model  1*  Model  1*  Model 2**  Model  1*  Model 2**
Corn Production Prices  -28.3  -28.5  1.1  -17.6  10.6
(-40.0)  (-40.0)  (-2.5)  (-40.0)  (-5.0)
Livestock  1.8  1.8  -0.3  13.0  11.4
Nonagricultural  Production  1.1  0.1  -2.7  -2.3  -3.4
Shadow  Prices
Family Labor  -0.5  0.0  1.4  1.1  1.8
Hired Labor  N.A.  N.A.  -0.4  N.A.  -0.65
Capital  -1.6  1.4  -0.6  10.1  8.6
Land  -2.2  -2.3  0.2  8.4  10.3
Household-Farm  Incomes
Total Nominal  -1.6  0.9  6.9  3.5  5.1
Total  Real  1.7  4.2  6.6  6.9  5.6
Real,  by Household Group:
Small-holder  8.8  10.3  3.2  14.6  6.9
Medium-holder  1.0  2.7  4.3  6.5  5.8
Large-holder  1.5  5.0  9.2  6.5  5.4
Consumption
Leisure  2.4  4.2  4.7  5.4  3.3
Staples  64.2  68.0  3.4  72.3  10.6
Manufactures  -1.6  0.7  6.5  3.6  5.1
External  Linkages
Migration  1.3  0.1  -3.5  -2.8  -4.6
Net  Imports:
Intermediate  -0.8  -1.4  1.6  -0.4  1.2
Final  -2.5  1.0  9.5  5.7  7.9
Total  -1.6  -0.3  5.5  2.5  4.5
*Perfect commodity markets.
**Missing  labour and staple  markets.
Source: Taylor, J.E., A. Yunez-Naude and S. Hampton.
If the  village  is linked  with the  commodity  markets  (Model  1),  the subsidy
results in an  overpayment to farmers,  because the corn income  loss is partially com-
pensated  by  the  reallocation  of family  resources  into  livestock  and  migration  acti-
vities. Total households'  nominal  income  increases slightly (by 0.9 percent)  and real
incomes  rise  for  all  household  groups in  the  two  models.  In Model  1, the  income
subsidy completely nullifies the decrease  in the marginal utility of leisure, and hence,
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the  shadow value  of family  labor,  relative  to Experiment  1. The  subsidy  therefore
dampens  the migration  effect of price  liberalization,  resulting  in little change  from
the base.
The  PROCAMPO  subsidy nearly  eliminates  the  negative  impact  of staple
price reform on trade linkages between  the village and the rest of Mexico.  However,
demand  for  intermediate goods produced  outside the village decreases by a greater
percentage  amount than before  because of the negative  effect of the income subsidy
on  village  corn  production.  By  contrast,  consumption  demand  for  village  (final)
imports  increases  by  1.0  percent.  So  the  combined  effect  of  production  and  con-
sumption  linkages is a small decrease  (0.3 percent) in village imports from the rest of
Mexico.
The  third  column  of  the  Table  of  Results  reports  the  simulated  effects  of
PROCAMPO  for a village  characterized  by a closed staple market  (Model  2).  In this
case,  households  benefit from the income subsidy without being directly affected by
the  staple  price  change.  The  interaction  of local  supply and  demand schedules  for
staples  determines  the  endogenous  local  staple  price.  In  the  first  instance,  the
PROCAMPO  subsidy  increases  household-farm  incomes  by  an  amount  equal  to
40 percent of the base value of corn production. This increases household-farms' con-
sumption demand for normal goods, including nontradeables  (leisure and corn). The
family wage increases and stimulates local production of the corn (by  1.1 percent).  It,
together  with a  higher family wage,  produces  a  contractionary  effect  on nonstaple
production, specially  nonagricultural  output, which falls  by 2.7  percent. The higher
family  wage  discourages  migration;  it  decreases  by  3.5  percent.  That  is,  migrant
workers are called home to benefit from the higher value of their labor. The migration
effect of PROCAMPO  in this closed staple-market economy stands in contrast to the
findings reported by Model  1 (second column of the Table of Results).
The  existence  of village  nontradeables  creates  local  income  linkages.  They,
together  with  the  direct  benefits  of  the  subsidy,  result  in  an  increase  in  total
household nominal  income of 6.9 percent  (in real terms,  6.6 percent).  The impact on
village trade is positive. The demand  for intermediate goods from the rest of Mexico
increases only slightly (1.6 percent)  because of the contraction in nonagricultural pro-
duction.  However,  higher  household  incomes  stimulate  trade  in consumer  goods
(9.5 percent).  As a result, total village imports increase by 5.5 percent.
Third Experiment. Our third experiment  explores the implications of allocating fiscal
savings from corn price liberalization to public investments designed to raise the pro-
ductivity of family resources in village activities.  The experiment  is done to compare
governmental  policies'  alternative  to  PROCAMPO.  So,  instead  of  direct  income
transfers, the public sector can use these resources in rural education or infrastructure
works that raise productivity  of family inputs in agricultural production.  The simu-
lation is based on an input productivity increase in the shift parameters in staple and
livestock production  by  10 percent.8 This is equivalent to raising the marginal value
products of all factors in crop and livestock production by 10 percent, as might result
from factor-neutral technological  change.
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A rise in agricultural productivity combined  with the corn price decline gene-
rates substantial increases in real income for all household  groups using either of the
two models  (fifth and sixth columns of Table of Results).  Total income gains are sub-
stantially greater in both real and nominal terms than under  the PROCAMPO  expe-
riment.  In  the  scenario  where  staples  are  tradeable  (Model  1),  corn  production
declines,  but this decline is one third smaller than without the productivity  increase
(18  percent,  compared  with  29  percent  in  Experiment  2).  Higher marginal  profita-
bility  leads  households  to  reallocate  resources  into  livestock  production,  which
increases  as much as  13 percent. The productivity increase reverses the decline in the
shadow value of family labor resulting from the corn price decrease  in Experiment  1.
As a result, migration now decreases  (by 2.8 percent)  rather than increasing.
In  the  closed  corn  market  scenario  (last  column  of  the  Table  of  Results),
increased  marginal productivity  in agricultural  production raises the supply of corn
(by 10.6 percent) while driving down the local  corn price (by 5 percent).  It also stimu-
lates  production  of the  agricultural  tradeable  (livestock),  although  by less  than  in
Model  1, where the economy  is not constrained to be self-sufficient  in staples. These
agricultural  activities  compete  with  nonagricultural  production  for  nontradeable
factors  (family  and  hired  labor).  As  a  result,  nonagricultural  output  falls  by
3.4 percent, and the  family wage  increases  (by  1.8  percent).  The higher  family wage
results  in  a  decrease  in  migration  (by  4.6  percent).  Total  nominal  income  rises  by
5.1  percent, and real income jumps 5.6  percent. All households  gain in both nominal
and real terms from the rise in agricultural productivity in both models.
Despite  the  contraction  of nonagricultural  production  in  the  village,  higher
household  incomes  stimulate  trade  linkages  on the consumption  side.  As  a result,
total village imports increase by 4.5  percent.
In short, the  presence  of  village  nontradeables  creates  income  linkages  and
price effects  that alter, both  quantitatively and  qualitatively, the impacts  of produc-
tivity gains on local  incomes and production. Income effects generally are larger and
tend to magnify linkages between the village and the outside world in traded-goods
markets. Nevertheless,  nontradeables  create inefficiencies  in  local and regional  pro-
duction, diverting scarce resources into the production of nontradeables in which the
village may not enjoy a comparative  advantage in regional markets. They also con-
strain  the  supply response  of tradeables.  This  is illustrated  by a  smaller  livestock
supply response to the productivity increase and also by a larger negative impact on
nonagricultural  production  in  the  closed  corn  market  scenario  (last column  of the
Table of Results).
8The choice of a  10  percent productivity increase  can be  taken as arbitrary, but it is not out of line with impacts of
education  and  technological  change  on productivity  in Mexico.  For example,  in  an econometric  study on  rural
productivity, education and  migration of eight villages in Mexico, we found that, controling for participation  in
different households'  activities, a one person increase  in family members with more  than nine years of education
is significantly associated with a 13  percent increase  in household income from staple production. This result can
be  explained  by the  fact  that  households  wFith higher  education  are  those  more  highly capitalized  and  more
closely linked to outside markets  (Taylor, J.E. and A. Yunez-Naude,  in press).
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SUMMARY  AND CONCLUSIONS
The results  of the impact  analysis based  on VGEM contrast  with findings  of
other  studies in some important  respects. A Nationwide  Computable General Equi-
librium Model that includes migration  (Robinson et al.,  1991)  estimates that NAFTA
and,  in particular,  the drop of the price of corn will have a much higher  increase in
migration  to  the  U.S.-around  40  percent  as  compared  with  our  estimation  of
1.3 percent from Model 1. The main reason for the difference  is that, due to the diver-
sified  nature  of small-farms  activities,  a drop  in the  price  of corn translates  into  a
much  smaller  decrease  in  total  farm  income.  In  other  words,  with  our  modeling
approach  we  consider  the  options  that  small  farms  have  in  getting  income  from
sources  different  from  corn production  (livestock,  nonagricultural  production  and
waged  labor).  In addition to  this,  our model captures  subsistence staple  producers
with deficits of corn production that benefit from the drop of the price of corn.9
Another study, extensively  used by the critics of NAFTA and agricultural libe-
ralization,  compares  the  U.S.  price  of  corn  with  the  costs  (monetary  and  non-
monetary)  of producing this crop in Mexico by small farmers.  Considering the result
that the U.S. price is lower, the author of this research concludes that corn production
in Mexico will tend to disappear and rural emigration  will sharply  increase  (Calva,
1995).  The  problem  with  this  analysis  is  that  it  is  partial  (Calva isolates  the pro-
duction  of  corn  from other  small  farmers'  activities  and  sources  of  income),  uses
wages to evaluate family labor costs, and implicitly assumes  no transaction  costs for
small farmers.
Our findings  based  on a stylized VGEM applied  to a typical village of small
producers of corn and livestock leads to the conclusion that the effects of NAFTA and
the liberalization  of the  producer  price of corn on the  domestic supply of this grain
will be lower than the predicted effect  of other studies. 10  In addition, small farmers'
livestock production is likely to increase with these reforms.
However,  these results  do not mean that small-scale  farm production is to be
ignored  in the design of Mexico's agricultural  policies.  In a sense, this has been  the
official  position  in Mexico.  It  is  reflected  by the  fact  that PROCAMPO  is based  on
income subsidies  to  all farmers  producing staples,  as well  as by the separation  the
last  two  Administrations  have  done  between  their  agricultural  economic  policies
from  their poverty  alleviation  policies.ll  By  contrast,  our model  results  show  that
using  scarce  public  resources  to  enhance  agricultural  productivity  in  villages  of
small-scale  staple and  livestock  producers  can  increase  their households'  incomes,
reduce  rural  emigration  and  increase  rural  demand  for  manufactured  goods.  In
addition,  this type of policy may enhance the rural non-farm economy,  a process that
9Another  difference  is  that a micro  economy-wide  model  compared with  a national  CGE model  needs  fewer
assumptions to estimate and calibrate the model, given the availability  of household-farm survey data.
10De Janvry et al. obtain similar conclusions using a different modeling approach and data.
lI
1 am  refering to the  current Administration  policy called PRODUCE,  which is basically  directed to subsidize
only those farmers with competitive  potential, and to SOLIDARIDAD, the poverty alleviation program initiated
by  President  Salinas  de  Gortari  which  is  separated,  formally  and  administratively  from  PROCAMPO  and
PRODUCE.
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has  accompanied  the  successful  development  processes  of  East  Asian  countries.
Government targeted investments  in rural education  and infrastructure are also fun-
damental  for  the development  of rural markets.  The  existence  of these markets  is a
requirement for reducing transaction costs faced by small-scale farmers as well as for
including  the notion  of competition  into the analysis  of the effects  of policy reforms
on small-scale farmers.
The suggestions  of public  investments directed  to villages  of small-scale  pro-
ducers  do  not contradict  the  purpose of harmonizing  North American  agricultural
policies,  if  we  take  that  to  mean  the  elimination  in  Canada,  Mexico  and  the
United States  of  prevailing  subsidies  to  (modern)  agricultural  producers  and
government direct intervention  in agriculture.
In  fact,  our discussion  leads  to  the  conclusion  that economic  harmonization
between  Mexico  and its North American  partners'  corn and  livestock sectors  is not
going to happen soon or even in the medium run.
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